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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. White argued that the district court's decision to use a
magistrate's probable cause determination as the sole basis to support its finding that
Mr. White violated the terms of his probation by committing a new offense violated his
due process right to confront witnesses. This brief is necessary to address the State's
argument that it was not required to produce a witness, Officer Koontz, at the probation
violation evidentiary hearing because Mr. White had the ability to subpoena Officer
Koontz. The State's argument is not supported by any authority and is directly contrary
to controlling United States Supreme Court precedent. Moreover, the State's argument
confuses the right to confront witness with the right to call witnesses.
Mr. White also argued that the district court's reliance on a magistrate's probable
cause determination to find that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation violated
his right to due process because it lowered the State's evidentiary burden from
preponderance of the evidence standard to a probable cause standard. This brief is
necessary to address the State's assertion that a preponderance of the evidence
standard is not the correct legal standard. This brief is also necessary to address the
State's alternative argument that Mr. White's right to due process was not violated when
the district court applied the incorrect legal standard when determining that Mr. White
violated the terms of his probation.
Mr. White also argued that the district court's determination that he violated the
terms of his probation was clearly erroneous because the district court did not rely on
any evidence when reaching its conclusion. The State counters with the argument that
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the minutes of the preliminary hearing provide a factual basis for the district court's
finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation.

Contrary to the State

assertion, the district court did not make any factual findings or provide any reasoning
based on the minutes of the preliminary hearing, and those constitutionally mandated
findings cannot be presumed on appeal.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated
in Mr. White's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are
incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUES
1)

Did the district court violate Mr. White's right to due process when it denied him
the right to confront witnesses and lowered the State's evidentiary burden during
the probation evidentiary hearing?

2)

Is the district court's finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation
clearly erroneous?

3

ARGUMENT
I.

The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Denied Him The
Right To Confront Witnesses And Lowered The State's Evidentiary Burden During The
Probation Evidentiary Hearing
A.

The District Court Violated Mr. White's Right To Due Process When It Denied
Him The Right To Confront Witnesses
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. White argued that the district court's decision to use a

magistrate's probable cause determination as the sole basis to support its finding that
Mr. White violated the terms of his probation by committing a new offense violated his
due process right to confront witnesses. (Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.) In response, the
State argued that it is not required "to produce a witness in order to establish that
[Mr. White] violated his probation." (Respondent's Brief, pp.3-13.) The State cites no
authority for this proposition. Not only is the State's argument unsupported by authority,
but it was also expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). In that case, Melendez-Diaz was being
charged with distributing cocaine and trafficking in cocaine.

Id. at 308. At trial, the

government submitted three "certificates of analysis" created by a laboratory technician
indicating that the substance at issue was cocaine. Id. Melendez-Diaz objected to this
on the basis of the Confrontation Clause and argued that the laboratory technician had
to testify in person. Id. at 309.
The issue eventually made its way to the United States Supreme Court, and one
of the arguments proffered by the government was that a lab technician's reports were
not subject to the Confrontation Clause because the analysis contained in the reports
did not constitute "accusatory" witnesses. Id. at 313. While rejecting this argument, the
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Melendez-Diaz Court drew a distinction between the Confrontation Clause and the

Compulsory Process Clause, holding that "the Confrontation Clause guarantees a
defendant the right to be confronted with the witnesses 'against him,' the Compulsory
Process Clause guarantees a defendant the right to call witnesses 'in his favor."' Id.
"The prosecution must produce the former; the defendant may call the latter." Id. at
313-314 (original emphasis) (footnote omitted).
After clarifying the difference between with the Confrontation Clause and the
Compulsory Process Clause, Melendez-Diaz Court addressed a separate argument that
"we should find no Confrontation Clause violation in this case because [Melendez-Diaz]
had the ability to subpoena the analysts." Id. at 324. In rejecting this argument, the
Court held:
But that power--whether pursuant to state law or the Compulsory Process
Clause-is no substitute for the right of confrontation. Unlike the
Confrontation Clause, those provisions are of no use to the defendant
when the witness is unavailable or simply refuses to appear.

Converting the prosecution's duty under the Confrontation Clause into the
defendant's privilege under state law or the Compulsory Process Clause
shifts the consequences of adverse-witness no-shows from the State to
the accused. More fundamentally, the Confrontation Clause imposes a
burden on the prosecution to present its witnesses, not on the defendant
to bring those adverse witnesses into court. Its value to the defendant is
not replaced by a system in which the prosecution presents its evidence
via ex parle affidavits and waits for the defendant to subpoena the affiants
if he chooses.
Id. at 324-325.

Accordingly, the mere fact that Mr. White could have subpoenaed

Officer Koontz to testify does not alleviate the State of its burden to present witnesses.
As such, the State's argument that the right to confront witnesses during probation
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proceedings only afforded Mr. White the ability to subpoena the police officer confuses
the right to confront witnesses with the right to call witnesses.
Additionally, both Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) and Gagnon v.

Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973), afford parolees and probationers 1 separate rights which
are analogous to rights protected by the Confrontation Clause and the Compulsory
Process Clause. According to the Morrissey Court, the minimal due process protections
afforded to probationers and parolees include:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the
parolee of evidence against him; (c) opporiunity to be heard in person and
to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront
and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a 'neutral
and detached' hearing body such as a traditional parole board, members
of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written
statement by the factfinders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for
revoking parole.

Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 (emphasis added). As mentioned above, the Confrontation
Clause requires the State to produce witnesses and the Compulsory Process Clause
provides the defendant the ability to call witnesses. Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S at 313314, 324-325. Morrissey provides parolees and probationers analogues to these two
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Morrissey, 408

U.S. at 489. It follows that Mr. White's ability to call witnesses on his own behalf at the
evidentiary hearing did not alleviate the State's burden to produce witnesses necessary
for it to prove that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation agreement.

Gagnon extended the holdings from Morrissey to probationers and, as such, the same
conditions applicable to parole revocation proceedings are applicable to probation
revocation proceedings. State v. Scraggins, 292 Idaho 867, 871 (2012).
1
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One might argue that the holding from Melendez-Diaz is not applicable to
probation proceedings. As argued above, Morrissey provides probationers the right to
call witnesses and a separate right to confront witnesses.

The difference between

these two rights would be meaningless if the ability to call witnesses subsumed the right
to confront witnesses.

Moreover, the plain language Morrissey indicates that the State

must provide witnesses when requested by a parolee or probationer.

In fact, this

language was quoted by the State in its Respondents' Brief, to wit, "[o]n request of the
parolee, [a] person who has given adverse information on which parole revocation is to
be based is to be made available for questioning in his presence." (Respondent's Brief,
pp.6, 10 (quoting Morrisey, 408 U.S. at 487) (emphasis added).) The requirement that
the requested witness "is to be made available" is a clear indication that the State must
provide witnesses which are adverse to the parolee or probationer upon the parolee's or
probationer's request.

Id.

If the foregoing sentence actually supported the State's

position, it would have stated that a parolee may call adverse witnesses to testify.
However, the United State's Supreme Court used mandatory language indicating that
the State must produce the requested witness.
Mr. White's primary argument in his Appellant's Brief, is that under State v.
Farmer, 131 Idaho 803, 806 (Ct. App. 1998), the district court failed to engage in a

mandatory balancing test before it determined that there was good cause for denying
Mr. White's request to confront Officer Koontz.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.5-11.)

response, the State argues:
The state acknowledges that the Court in Farmer engaged in such an
analysis; however, the question is whether the Court was required to do
so. The state submits it was not because the good cause analysis only
applies when the probationer or parolee is prevented from questioning an
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In

adverse witness. This is consistent with the right as it was articulated in
Morrissey where the Court noted that the parolee could request to
question an adverse witness, but the hearing officer could prevent such a
questioning if he "determine[d] that an informant would be subjected to
risk of harm if his identity were disclosed." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487.

Because the district court did not prevent [Mr. White] from calling
any witnesses, [Mr. White] was not deprived of his right to confront the
evidence against him and the court was not required to engage in a good
cause analysis.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.10-12.)
The State's position, that the district court was not required to conduct the
balancing test required under the Farmer holding, is specious at best.

There is no

question that the district court in this matter was required to conduct the balancing test
promulgated in Farmer, because Farmer is binding precedent. The district court was
not free to disregard appellate precedent, as the Idaho Supreme Court recently

observed:
Trial courts are not free to willfully disregard precedent from the appellate
courts of this state. We reiterate our previous position on this subject:
The entire Court membership had the same understanding
as to the effect of a new principle of law announced by the
Court of Appeals; it becomes precedential law of this state,
and all tribunals inferior to the Court of Appeals are obligated
to abide by decisions issued by the Court of Appeals. To our
knowledge, neither a district judge nor a trial judge has ever
suggested not being bound by new principles of law,
whether they emanate from this Court or from the Court of
Appeals ....
State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 986, 842 P.2d 660, 665 (1992)
(emphasis in original). Although the district court's statements in this case
demonstrate that the final partial sentence in this quotation is now
outdated, we take this opportunity to remind trial judges that they do not
have the liberty to consciously disregard the principles of law articulated
by the appellate courts of this state.
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State v. Hanson, 152 Idaho 314,325 n.6 (2012).
The State's argument is also flawed because it is based on a misunderstanding
of the right to confront witnesses and the separate right to call witnesses.

When a

probationer exercises his/her right to confront witnesses at an evidentiary hearing, the
State has the burden to produce the requested witness.
313-314, 324-325; Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487, 489.

Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S at

In the event the State provides

good cause 2 to deny the probationer this right to confront a specific witness, then the
district court must conduct the balancing test mandated by Farmer. 3 It should also be
noted that a different test is applied when the district court denies a probationer the right
to call witnesses.

In order to establish prejudice for the denial of the right to call

witnesses the following standards are applied:
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution, as applied to the
states by the fourteenth amendment, obliges the government, upon
request, to make a good faith effort to locate and to secure witnesses
favorable to the defense. See generally Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 87 S.Ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1967). "[T]he compulsory process
clause gives defendants definite but limited protection: it guarantees not
that the state will always succeed in producing witnesses for the defense,
but that it will make an appropriate effort to do so." Westen, Confrontation
and Compulsory Process: A Unified Theory of Evidence for Criminal
Cases, 91 HARV.L.REV. 567, 595 (1978) (hereinafter cited as
Confrontation and Compulsory Process ).

2

A risk of harm to the witness, the invocation of a testimonial privilege, significant
expense, and other significant difficulty could be the basis for a finding of good cause.
See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487; see also Young v. United States, 863 A.2d 804, 808
~D.C. 2004).
The State concedes that it did not provide any reason why Officer Koontz was not
available to testify at Mr. White's probation violation evidentiary hearing. (Respondent's
Brief, p.5.)
9

When a person is available the state must procure his attendance if he
would be a witness favorable to the defense, competent to give testimony
that is relevant and material.

Relevant Testimony. "A defendant has no constitutional right to produce
witnesses whose testimony is wholly irrelevant to his defense."
Material Testimony. Materiality goes to the weight of the evidence. Factors
in determining materiality include the relative importance of the issue, the
extent to which the issue is in dispute, the number of other witnesses who
have testified on the issue and the credibility of the witness in relation to
other witnesses.
State v. Garza, 109 Idaho 40, 42-43 (Ct. App. 1985) (original emphasis). In order to
preserve the denial of the right to call witnesses for appellate review, the probationer
must make an offer of proof establishing that the witness at issue would provide
favorable, relevant, and material evidence.

State v. Hanslovan, 116 Idaho 266, 268

(Ct. App. 1989).
Two points can be adduced from the foregoing. First, a materiality test is applied
when the right to call a witness is denied. This is entirely different than the good cause
balancing test which must be applied before denying a probationer the right to confront
witnesses. Second, even when a probationer exercises his/her right to call a witness
the State has an affirmative obligation to "make an appropriate effort" to produce the
witness for the defendant.

Garza, 109 Idaho at 42.

Again the State is arguing,

"[b]ecause the district court did not prevent [Mr. White] from calling any witnesses,
[Mr. White] was not deprived of his right to confront the evidence against him and the
court was not required to engage in a good cause analysis."

(Respondent's Brief,

pp.10-12.) The State's argument interchanges a compulsory process issue, right to call
witnesses, with the issue of the denial of the right to confront witnesses.

But even

assuming Mr. White was making a compulsory process claim, which he is not, the State
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does not cite to the correct test which is utilized when a probationer advances a
compulsory process claim on appeal. Even if Mr. White made a compulsory process
claim, the State still had the obligation to make reasonable attempts to procure the
witness for him, which it did not.
The State also argues that even if Mr. White is correct that the district court erred
by failing to conduct the good cause balancing test the error is harmless because
Mr. White had an opportunity to cross-examine the State's witness at the preliminary
hearing.

(Respondent's Brief, pp.12-13.)

The error is not harmless because the

motivations during cross-examination at a preliminary hearing are different than the
motivations to cross-examine a witness at an evidentiary hearing for a probation
violation. For example, some defense attorneys will not rigorously cross-examine the
State's witnesses at a preliminary hearing as a tactic to prevent disclosing potential trial
strategies. Additionally, Mr. White could have discovered impeachment evidence which
he was not aware of at the time of preliminary hearing. Further, since the State failed to
even provide a transcript of the preliminary hearing, Mr. White was not able to
undermine the district court's probable cause determination with the minutes of the
preliminary hearing alone. Mr. White also submits, based on the separate due process
violation address in Section 1B, infra, that this error cannot be harmless because the
district court employed a probable cause determination in lieu of a preponderance of the
evidence determination.
In sum, the State's arguments are contrary to controlling precedent and are
based on a misapplication of that precedent. As such, the State's arguments should be
rejected as meritless.
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B.

The District Court Violated Mr. White's Ri ht To Due Process When It Lowered
The State's Evidentiary Burden During The Guilt Phase Of The Probation
Revocation Hearing
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. White argued that his right to due process was

denied when the district court relied on a probable cause determination in order to find
that Mr. White violated the terms of probation. (Appellant's Brief, pp.11-15.) For the
purposes of this appeal, the State assumes that a preponderance of the evidence
standard applies. (Respondent's Brief, p.13, n.4.) However, it also asserts there is no
authority for this proposition, because there is no clear case law holding that a
preponderance of the evidence standard is applied during probation revocation
proceedings. (Respondent's Brief, p.13, n.4.) It should be noted that the State does not
refute Mr. White's argument that the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the State must
provide the same process when terminating a probationer from probation as it does
when revoking a parolee's parole, State v. Scraggins, 292 Idaho 867, 871 (2012), and
that I.C. § 20-2298 provides that a preponderance of the evidence standard is
applicable at parole revocation proceedings. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12.) It follows that a
preponderance of the evidence standard must be applied during probation revocation
proceedings; otherwise the proceedings which occur during probation revocation would
not be the same as those which occur prior to the revocation of parole.
Additionally, in Morrissey, it was held that an evidentiary hearing "must be the
basis for more than determining probable cause; it must lead to a final evaluation of any
contested relevant facts and consideration of whether the facts as determined warrant
revocation." Id. at 488.

Mr. White is not aware of an evidentiary standard which is

higher than probable cause and lower than a preponderance of the evidence. Logic
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dictates that the standard has to preponderance of the evidence.

The only other

alternative standard is a clear and convincing standard, because the State need not
prove a probation violation beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Rose, 144 Idaho
762, 765 (2007).
The State next argues that the district court did not apply the wrong standard
because "there is nothing that would preclude a court from finding that the same
evidence that establishes probable cause also satisfies the higher standard of proof and
there is nothing in the record to support the claim that the district court applied the
wrong standard of proof." (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) In support of this, the State cites
to Morrissey for the proposition that "Obviously a parolee cannot relitigate issues
determined against him in other forums."

(Respondent's Brief, p.15.)

There are a

couple of problems with the State's argument, the first is that the quote from Morrissey
is misleading because that was reference to a prior conviction, which can be used to
establish a probation violation.

The full sentence follows, "Obviously a parolee cannot

relitigate issues determined against him in other forums, as in the situation presented
when the revocation is based on conviction of another crime." Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
490 (emphasis added). Mr. White is not contending that an evidentiary hearing is an
appropriate forum to collaterally attack a prior conviction. Moreover, the use of a prior
conviction as the sole basis for a finding that a probationer violated a term of probation
is consistent with Mr. White's argument because the standard for a criminal conviction is
beyond a reasonable doubt which is much higher than a preponderance of the evidence
standard. State v. Day, 154 Idaho 649, 651 n.1 (Ct. App. 2013). Further, the notion
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that a new conviction can be used as the basis for a probation violation is well
established in Idaho. Id. at 650-652.
The second problem with the State's argument is it assumes the district court
was considering the "same evidence" as the magistrate, when, in fact, the two judges
were considering very different information. (Respondent's Brief, p.15.) The magistrate
was actually listening to the police officer's live testimony.
Preliminary Hearing, pp.1-2 (11/03/14 Augmentation).)

(02/21/14 Minutes of the

In this case, the district court

only had the minutes of the preliminar1 hearing, so the district court did not have access
to the actual testimony provided during the preliminary hearing. Moreover, the minutes
of a preliminary hearing are merely a clerk's own interpretation of what occurred at the
preliminary hearing, which might not accurately represent what occurred at that hearing.
As argued in Section 11, infra, the district court did not make any factual findings based
on the minutes of the preliminary hearing, so it was only considering the magistrate's
probable cause determination.
The State also argues that Brandt v. Idaho Comm'n for Pardons and Parole, 135
Idaho 208 (Ct. App. 2000), 4 does not support Mr. White's claim of error. In Brandt, the
Court of Appeals held that a probable cause hearing conducted for a misdemeanor
charge was not the equivalent of the preliminary prerevocation hearing described in

Morrissey. Id. at 210-212. In coming to this conclusion, the Court of Appeals reasoned

It should be noted that in Brandt, the Court of Appeals cited to Morrissey for the
proposition that, "[o]n the parolee's request, the source of the adverse information upon
which the violation report is based must be made available for questioning in the
parolee's presence." Brandt, 135 Idaho at 210 (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 487.)
This interpretation of the right to confront witnesses set forth in Morrissey is consistent
with Mr. White's position set forth in Section IA, supra.
4
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that the procedures employed during the misdemeanor preiiminary hearing, where not
as stringent as ones employed during a probation violation preliminary hearing. Id. at
211-212.

The State argues that the foregoing holding is not helpful to Mr. White

because the "Court of Appeals' determination in Brandt that the court failed to comply
with the procedural requirements under Morrissey has no bearing on White's claim that
the district court applied an incorrect legal standard in its revocation decision."
(Respondent's Brief, pp.15-16 (footnote omitted).)
The implicit premise in the State's argument is that the application of the
appropriate legal standard, preponderance of the evidence, is not a procedural
requirement. Contrary to the State's unsupported assertion, due process requires that
the district court employ the correct legal standard when revoking probation.

In his

Appellant's Brief, Mr. Whites cited to State v. Erickson, 148 Idaho 679, 685-686 (Ct.
App. 2010), for the proposition that a "due process violation occurs when the State's
evidentiary burden has been artificially lowered by its own actions or the actions of the
court." (Appellant's Brief, p.13.) According to the Erickson Court:
The requirement that the State prove every element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt is grounded in the constitutional guarantee of
due process. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 309, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2783,
61 L.Ed.2d 560, 567 (1979); State v. Mubita, 145 Idaho 925, 942, 188
P.3d 867, 884 (2008); State v. Crowe, 135 Idaho 43, 47, 13 P.3d 1256,
1260 (Ct.App.2000). This standard of proof "plays a vital role in the
American scheme of criminal procedure" because it "provides concrete
substance for the presumption of innocence-that bedrock 'axiomatic and
elementary' principle whose 'enforcement lies at the foundation of the
administration of our criminal law.' " In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363, 90
S.Ct. 1068, 1072, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970) (quoting Coffin v. United
States, 156 U.S. 432, 453, 15 S.Ct. 394, 402, 39 L.Ed. 481, 491 (1895)). It
follows that a misstatement to a jury of the State's burden rises to the level
of fundamental error because it goes to the foundation of the case and
would take away from a defendant a right essential to his or her defense.
Raudebaugh, 124 Idaho at 769, 864 P.2d at 607.
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Id. Similarly, the requirement that a district court must find, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that a probationer violated the terms of probation before revoking probation,
is a procedure at the center of Morrissey. The other procedures required by Morrissey,
which include written notice of alleged violations, disclosure of adverse evidence, the
right call witnesses, the right to confront witnesses, etc... , Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489,
would be meaningless if the district court could erroneously use a lower evidentiary
standard when determining whether a probationer violated the terms of probation. If the
State's argument were taken to its logical conclusion, the initial probable cause
determination required to hold a probationer for a probation violation, could be used to
replace the subsequent evidentiary hearing, which requires more than a probable cause
determination. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 488.
In sum, the district court's sole reliance on a magistrate's probable cause
determination to find that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation violated his rights
to due process because it lowered the State's evidentiary burden from preponderance
of the evidence to probable cause. The State has failed to provide authority or a logical
argument for the proposition that some standard, other than a preponderance of the
evidence, is applied during a probation evidentiary hearing.

Further, the State

incorrectly asserts that the use of the correct legal standard is not part of the legal
procedures mandated by Morrissey.
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11.
The District Court's Finding That Mr. White Violated The Terms Of His Probation Is
Clearly Erroneous
Mr. White argued that the district court abused its discretion because it made no
factual findings, other than relying on another judge's determination there was probable
cause to believe that Mr. White had committed a new criminal offense, that Mr. White
actually violated a term of his probation.

(Appellant's Brief, pp.15-16.)

The State

responds, by arguing that the minutes from the preliminary hearing provide factual
support for the district court's finding that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation.
(Respondent's Brief, pp.15, 17-18.)
Contrary to the State's assertion, the district court did not provide any analysis of
the minutes of the preliminary hearing, so it cannot be said that it relied on any
evidence, other than the district court's probable cause determination. According the
district court, "I find that allegation one has been proven as [it] pertains to driving under
the influence and that that was willful based on the minutes of the February 21st, 2014,
hearing, the order holding or bindover order that was signed that same day . . .. "
(Tr., p.9, Ls.1-9.) The Court then rejected the allegation that Mr. White violated the
terms of his probation for driving without privileges because the only evidence submitted
in support of that violation was Officer Koontz's traffic citation.

(Tr., p.9, Ls.15-22.)

According to the district court, "in order for me to take judicial notice there has to be
something in the file that would indicate that a neutral detached magistrate's taken a
look at it and determined that probable cause exists, so that has not been proven."
(Tr., p.9, Ls.16-21.) The district court made it clear that it was making the determination
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that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation solely on the magistrate's probable
cause determination.
Equally of importance is the fact that the district court did not orally provide any
analysis of the minutes from the preliminary hearing and failed to provide factual
findings based on those minutes. In other words, the district court was not exercising its
own independent judgment based on the minutes of the preliminary hearing. Instead, it
was solely relying on the magistrate's probable cause determination. This is important
because Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489 and State v. Chapman, 111 Idaho 149, 152-153
(1986) both require either an oral or "written statement by the factfinders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking [probation]." "The written statement
required by . . . Morrissey helps to insure accurate factfinding with respect to any
alleged violation and provides an adequate basis for review to determine if the decision
rests on permissible grounds supported by the evidence."

Id. at 152-153 (quoting

Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 613 (1985) (original emphasis).)

As such, the State's

appellate assertion that the district court considered the same evidence as the
magistrate court is not accurate.

Additionally, the State cannot for the first time on

appeal, point to the minutes of the preliminary hearing and argue from that there is
evidence which supports the district court's reasoning where the district court failed to
make factual findings and provide its analysis based on those findings.
As a final point, there is a relevant distinction between a sentencing hearing and
a probation evidentiary hearing, in that an appellate court can presume a trial court's
sentencing determination is supported by the facts in the record. However, Morrison
and Chapman indicate that no such appellate presumption is applied to the evidentiary
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potion of probation revocation proceedings. In State v. Flowers, 150 Idaho 568 (2011 ),
the court held that a district court need not expressly articulate it's the reasons for its
sentencing determination on the record. Id. at 575. The Idaho Court of Appeals has
also held that "when a trial court does not make explicit findings of fact, [the appellate
court] will examine the record to determine the implicit findings that underlie the trial
court's determination and uphold those implicit findings if they are supported by
substantial evidence." State v. Northover, 133 Idaho 655, 659 (Ct. App. 1999).) As
addressed above, Morrissey and Chapman make it clear that, in Idaho, a district court
must make factual findings and provide reasoning from those findings to support a
finding that a probationer violated a term of probation. The district court did not make its
required findings in this case, and neither the State nor this Court can look at the record
and presume that the information in record supports the district court's determination
that Mr. White violated the terms of his probation.
In sum, the district court based its determination that Mr. White violated the terms
of his probation based solely on the magistrate's probable cause determination. Since,
the district court did not independently make this determination based on any other facts
in this record, that determination cannot be upheld on appeal.

CONCLUSION
Mr. White respectfully requests that this Court remand this case for further
proceedings.
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